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firms leaves in place a potential source of finan-
cial crisis. Although there is pending legislation
in Congress, a major restructuring of these firms
and genuine reform appear to be as distant as ever.
My initial curiosity about the GSEs was stoked
simply by the size of these firms. As I investigated
further, I became concerned about their thin capi-
tal positions and the realization that if any of
them got into financial trouble the markets and
the federal government would look to the Federal
Reserve to deal with the problem. As I worked
through the issues, I began to speak on the sub-
ject; my first such speech was in October 2001
(Poole, 2001). I last spoke on a GSE topic two years
ago, before the St. Louis Society of Financial
Analysts. My title then was “GSE Risks” (Poole,
2005). Given that the risks did not seem likely to
disappear any time soon, about six months ago I
settled on a GSE topic once again.
Today I want to look back over the past few
years to summarize a few of the changes that
have occurred at the GSEs and in the regulatory
environment they face. It is no exaggeration to
say these have been event-filled years for the
GSEs, primarily because of disclosures of account-
ing irregularities at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Although these firms stopped growing when the
irregularities were disclosed, I will emphasize
that once they get their houses in good order they
will likely resume rapid growth because of the
special advantages they enjoy in the marketplace
from their ties to the federal government. I remain
hopeful that Congress will eventually pass mean-
ingful GSE reform legislation. Private sector finan-
cial firms ought to have an intense interest in
reform legislation. Still, given that there seems
O
ne of the Federal Reserve’s most
important responsibilities is main-
tenance of financial stability. The
job obviously, and sometimes dra-
matically, encompasses crisis response. However,
the very existence of a crisis, when one occurs,
often demonstrates a failure of some sort, on the
part of the firms involved, the government, or
the Federal Reserve. It would not be difficult to
cite examples of such failures.
Not long after coming to the St. Louis Fed
in 1998, I became interested in government-
sponsored enterprises, or GSEs. My interest arose
when I began digging into aggregate data on the
financial markets and discovered how large these
firms are. The bulk of all GSE assets are in the
housing GSEs—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
the 12 federal home loan banks (FHLBs). Using
information as of September 30, 2006—the latest
available as of this writing—these 14 firms have
total assets of $2.67 trillion; given their thin capital
positions, their total liabilities are only a little
smaller. Just two firms—Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac—account for $1.65 trillion of the assets, or
62 percent of all housing GSE assets. Moreover,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have guaranteed
mortgage-backed securities outstanding of $2.82
trillion. Thus, the housing GSE liabilities on
their balance sheets and guaranteed obligations
off their balance sheets are about $4.47 trillion,
which may be compared with U.S. government
debt in the hands of the public of $4.83 trillion.
In what follows, I’ll confine most of my com-
ments to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, where
the largest issues arise. My purpose is to make
the case once again that failure to reform theseto be so little appreciation of the importance of
the GSE issue, where do they—and we—go from
here?
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments—especially Bill Emmons, senior economist,
who provided special assistance.
THE HOUSING GSEs SINCE
JUNE 9, 2003
Although the housing GSEs are less obscure
than they used to be, they are not much discussed
in recent months. A year ago I would have noted
that it was not unusual to find stories about the
GSEs on the front pages of major financial news-
papers. They were the subject of substantial
debate in Congress and among financial policy
experts. They had escaped from obscurity, pri-
marily because of publicity in recent years over
their accounting irregularities. But today they
seem to be returning to obscurity.
For Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two
stockholder-owned housing GSEs, history can be
divided into two distinct eras—before June 2003
and after. June 9, 2003, was the day the board of
directors of Freddie Mac announced discovery
of significant accounting irregularities. The stock
prices of both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
plunged, as investors immediately realized that
something might have gone terribly wrong with
both GSEs. Subsequent investigations by private
experts and public authorities confirmed the fears
of many investors and financial supervisors.
These giant, fast-growing firms had poor account-
ing systems and financial controls.
Because it is important for my analysis later,
keep in mind these facts: First, the effect of dis-
closure of accounting irregularities at Freddie
Mac on June 9, 2003, led to a decline of 16 percent
in Freddie’s stock price and 5 percent in Fannie’s
stock price that day. However, as I’ll document
later, the effect of these disclosures on the mort-
gage market was negligible. Similarly, when
Fannie’s accounting irregularities were disclosed
on September 22, 2004, its stock fell by 6.5 per-
cent that day and by a total of 13.5 percent over
a three-day period; the mortgage rate was again
unaffected.
Fortunately for financial stability, the account-
ing irregularities at Freddie Mac had been
designed, as we later learned, to understate earn-
ings by a total of about $9 billion over a period
of years. Thus, there was no question of Freddie
Mac defaulting on any of its obligations and
immediately unleashing unpredictable effects
on its counterparties or the financial system. In
2004, we learned that Fannie Mae’s accounting
was revealed to be faulty. In December 2006,
Fannie restated its earnings for 2002, 2003, and
the first half of 2004, revealing that it had over-
stated its earnings by a total of about $6 billion.
Fannie and Freddie are supervised by the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight,
or OFHEO. In both cases, OFHEO’s early response
to disclosure of the accounting irregularities was
to declare the enterprises “significantly under-
capitalized” because their extremely high lever-
age makes uncertainty of any kind about the true
capital backing of their portfolios a risk to their
own safety and soundness, as well as the stability
of the financial system. Beginning in the first
quarter of 2004, OFHEO required Freddie Mac to
hold capital at least 30 percent above the statutory
minimum level; OFHEO imposed the identical
requirement on Fannie Mae in the third quarter
of 2005. In addition, OFHEO required the firms
to correct their accounting; undertake a thorough
review of corporate governance, incentives, and
compensation; appoint an independent chief
risk officer; and refrain from increasing their
retained portfolios.
The stunning accounting irregularities at
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae served as wake-up
calls both to the GSEs themselves and to the
supervisory and legislative communities. Freddie
Mac fired virtually all of its top-level management
immediately in June 2003 and then, a few months
later, fired the new CEO it had hired to replace
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half later, Fannie Mae ejected its own top man-
agers, who had repeatedly declared that, unlike
Freddie’s, its own books were clean. The boards
of both companies agreed to a series of governance
reforms designed to bring the GSEs into line with
other large financial firms. Hundreds of millions
of shareholder dollars were committed to rebuild-
ing accounting and control systems at both firms.
Both firms agreed to restate earnings for the past
few years; so massive was this undertaking that
neither firm is current on its financial reporting.
Freddie did release its annual report for 2005
but, according to its press release of January 5,
2007, may revise its results materially for the first
nine months and the third quarter of 2006. Nor
is Fannie filing current reports. In December 2006,
Fannie filed its Form 10-K for 2004 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Currently, investors in common stock or debt
obligations issued by both companies rely on
partial and incomplete information subject to
material revision.
The GSE accounting scandals constituted a
rude awakening for OFHEO and Congress. OFHEO
was caught napping at Freddie Mac but, to its
credit, then identified Fannie Mae’s shortcomings
on its own. Once alerted to the problems, OFHEO’s
tenacious investigations into wrongdoing at both
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae spurred investiga-
tions by the SEC and the Department of Justice.
Congressional hearings were held, and GSE reform
legislation was passed in oversight committees
of both houses of Congress in 2004 and 2005,
although no final legislation has been enacted as
of this time. I’ll have more to say about reform
legislation later, because I think this is an impor-
tant missing piece of the overall puzzle.
Meanwhile, the FHLBs—the “other housing
GSEs”—were enduring accounting and control
crises of their own. Two of the twelve FHLBs
signed written regulatory agreements in 2004
with their supervisor, the Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB), to rectify portfolio risk-
management deficiencies. Then, in 2005, 10 of
the 12 FHLBs failed to meet their agreed dead-
line to register their stock with the SEC. Like
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, all of the FHLBs
restated their earnings for recent years; all have
now returned to timely filing of accounting
statements.
So where do we stand? I would characterize
the current situation as a period of uneasy wait-
ing. The GSEs have grown much more slowly,
and they have been more reticent in public in
recent quarters than they had been during the
pre-2003 decade. It appears that they want to
pursue a low-key strategy while memories of
their accounting and control failures gradually
fade. Their aim, apparently, is to return to the





Although I think much more needs to be done,
it would be a mistake to believe that nothing use-
ful was done after severe accounting problems
surfaced in June 2003. In general terms, the most
important achievement is a much broader and
better-informed discussion of the risks to financial
stability posed by the GSEs.2 We were fortunate
that the GSE accounting and governance scan-
dals did not threaten the immediate solvency of
the enterprises and that the problems surfaced
when the economy and financial markets were
strong.
I will point to six major contributions to the
public investigation into, and debate about, the
risks posed by the GSEs. There have been other
contributors, to be sure, but this list provides
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1 Freddie Mac’s board of directors had misjudged at first how deeply ingrained the internal-control and governance problems were and had
hired the former CFO to become the new CEO.
2 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Poole (2005).what I think is a good overview of the issues and
what we have learned so far:
• a 2003 study by Dwight Jaffee of interest
rate risks run by the GSEs;
• a 2003 study by OFHEO of the potential
systemic risks posed by the GSEs;
• a series of testimonies and speeches by
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan;
• a series of research papers prepared by
Federal Reserve System staff members;
• the results of a Federal Reserve ad hoc
study group investigating counterparty
exposures and risks in the over-the-
counter interest rate derivatives markets;
• and an economic-capital analysis of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prepared by
Kenneth Posner, an equity analyst at
Morgan Stanley.
These bullet points provide the flavor of
some of the recent work on the GSEs. The appen-
dix to this speech provides a brief summary of
each of these items and citations.
Considering these results as a whole, we have
learned a great deal in recent years about the
way the GSEs operate, the risks they are taking
and how they attempt to manage them, and what
effects the GSEs have on financial markets during
normal times as well as during periods of market
turbulence. Armed with this knowledge, law-
makers and policymakers are in a much better
position to make needed improvements in the
statutory and regulatory environment in which
the GSEs operate.
THE CASE FOR FUNDAMENTAL
REFORM
I continue to believe that the nation would
be well-served by turning the GSEs into genuinely
private firms, without government backing,
implied or explicit. If they bolster their capital,
they can function perfectly well as purely private
firms.
A key issue for many is whether privatizing
Fannie and Freddie would raise mortgage rates
paid by borrowers. We now have some solid evi-
dence on how the mortgage market would func-
tion if the housing GSEs became fully private
firms. A careful econometric investigation by
three economists at the Board of Governors last
year (Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund, 2006,
abstract) reached this conclusion: “We find that
GSE portfolio purchases have no significant effects
on either primary or secondary mortgage rate
spreads.” Put another way, the 30-year mortgage
rate fluctuates in tandem with the rate on 10-year
Treasury bonds and the spread over the Treasury
rate is not affected by portfolio purchases by
Fannie and Freddie.
Another approach to acquiring evidence on
the effects on the mortgage rate of mortgage pur-
chases by Fannie and Freddie is to examine what
happened when their portfolios stopped growing
in the wake of disclosures of accounting irregu-
larities. Those disclosures led OFHEO to impose
30 percent temporary surcharges on the firms’
required minimum capital levels. Freddie Mac’s
capital surcharge was imposed in January 2004,
whereas Fannie Mae’s capital surcharge became
effective in September 2004.3 To meet the higher
capital ratio, the two firms had to do some com-
bination of raising new capital and reducing their
portfolios.
The retained portfolios of mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) held by Fannie
and Freddie grew strongly in the years preceding
the OFHEO orders. For example, if we look at
year-end figures for 2002 and 2003, we see that
over the course of 2003 the two firms’ retained
portfolios grew by a net of 12.3 percent and, at
the end of 2003, they held 22 percent of outstand-
ing mortgages on 1- to 4-family properties. Net
growth of their retained portfolios then stopped;
over the course of both 2004 and 2005, their total
portfolios of mortgages and MBS fell slightly. In
2006, their retained portfolios continued to
3 See www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/capclass93004.pdf.
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4decline and by the end of the third quarter their
portfolios were below year-end 2005. Meanwhile,
the total market continued to expand. The com-
bined market share of Fannie and Freddie fell
from 22 percent at the end of 2003 to 14 percent
at the end of the third quarter of 2006.
What happened to the mortgage spread when
the GSEs stopped accumulating ever-larger port-
folios? Nothing. Because fixed-rate mortgages
are subject to prepayment risk, whereas the 10-
year Treasury bond is not, there is a degree of
variability of the mortgage spread. But if the ces-
sation of the GSEs’ portfolio growth had made a
difference, it surely would have shown up in the
data. The annual average of the spread in 2003,
before the OFHEO orders that restricted Fannie
and Freddie’s portfolio growth, was 180 basis
points; the spread was 157 basis points in both
2004 and 2005.
Nor did we observe any sort of shock to the
market when the accounting irregularities at
Freddie were disclosed in June 2003. The spread
was 196 basis points in May 2003, 198 basis points
in June, and 196 basis points in July. Consider
also January 2004, when OFHEO imposed a capi-
tal surcharge on Freddie. That month, the mort-
gage spread was 159 basis points. The month
before, the spread was 161 basis points; the month
after, 156 basis points. The OFHEO order apply-
ing to Fannie came in September 2004. That
month the spread was 163 basis points; the month
before, 159; the month after, 162.
Toward the beginning of my remarks, I noted
that disclosure of the accounting irregularities
did affect the stock prices of the two firms. Now
we see that there was no effect on the mortgage
market. The issue, clearly, is the profitability of
the firms and not effects on the mortgage market.
The effects of problems at Fannie and Freddie
on the mortgage market have been minimal
because the market contains many competent
and well-capitalized competitors that can readily
pick up the slack when other players stumble.
Financial firms throughout the economy
ought to have an intense interest in reforming
the GSEs. One reason is simply that banks and
other financial firms, and many nonfinancial
firms, hold large amounts of GSE obligations and
GSE-guaranteed MBS. I believe that many risk
managers simply accept that GSEs are effectively
backstopped by the Federal Reserve and the fed-
eral government without ever thinking through
how such implicit guarantees would actually
work in a crisis. The view seems to be that some-
one, somehow, would do what is necessary in a
crisis. Good risk management requires that the
“someone” be identified and the “somehow” be
specified. I have emphasized before that if you
are thinking about the Federal Reserve as the
“someone,” you should understand that the Fed
can provide liquidity support but not capital.4
As for the “somehow,” I urge you to be sure you
understand the extent of the president’s powers
to provide emergency aid, the likely speed of
congressional action, and the possibility that
political disputes would slow resolution of the
situation.
There is a long-run issue that goes beyond
that of today’s systemic risk. The fact is that it is
very profitable for a firm to be able to borrow at
close to the Treasury rate, lend at the market rate,
and hold little capital. That is why the promise
of constraints on the portfolio growth at Fannie
and Freddie had a significant effect on their stock
prices. Any firm with such a privileged position
will want to extend its scope of operations. Over
the past 15 years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have grown much more rapidly than has the
stock of mortgages outstanding and, as a conse-
quence, now hold or guarantee a large fraction of
U.S. home mortgages. At the end of 1990, they
held in their portfolios 5 percent of the mortgages
for 1- to 4-family properties; the share peaked at
22 percent at the end of 2003; and, at the end of
the third quarter of 2006, the share was 14 per-
cent. Given the powerful incentive Fannie and
Freddie have to grow, the systemic risk they pose
to the economy will also grow.
Once their current accounting problems are
fully resolved, Fannie and Freddie will want to
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4 For a discussion of Federal Reserve emergency powers, see Poole (2004).resume their growth. It is simply very profitable
to be able to borrow at close to the Treasury rate
and invest in mortgages while holding minimal
capital. Banks maintain capital ratios double or
more the ratios that Fannie and Freddie maintain.
Banks pay deposit insurance premiums to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, whereas
Fannie and Freddie pay no insurance premiums.
Assuming that the implied guarantee would, in a
crisis, lead to a federal bailout, U.S. taxpayers
bear the risk while the shareholders and man-
agers of Fannie and Freddie enjoy the profits.
This situation encourages these firms to grow
vigorously.
These two firms, however, cannot meet their
growth targets in the long run if they confine
their operations to conforming home mortgages.
Their interest in increasing the conforming mort-
gage limit is clear. Moreover, in my opinion, it is
inevitable that they will look for ways to extend
their operations into new areas. They have that
clear incentive because of the implicit federal
guarantee they enjoy. For them to extend their
operations into market segments already well
served by existing private firms will not enhance
the efficiency of mortgage markets or reduce
costs to mortgage borrowers.
There are two possible ways to constrain the
operations of the GSEs to areas with a clear public
purpose. One is to end the implied federal guar-
antee so that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac com-
pete on an equal basis with other fully private
firms. The other is to place restrictions on the
size of their owned portfolios if they retain their
privileged position. Their owned portfolios should
be limited to mortgages held temporarily in the
process of securitization.
Absent complete privatization, or on the way
to it, Congress should strengthen the powers of
OFHEO or a successor regulator. OFHEO has
weaker powers than provided by law to the fed-
eral bank regulators—the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The GSE
supervisory framework remains fragmented and
weak, as the GAO has pointed out on numerous
occasions.5 Thus, structural change of the GSEs
and their supervision should be at the top of the
reform agenda. There is a glaring need for legis-
lation to clarify the bankruptcy process should a
GSE fail. At present, there is no process and no
one knows what would happen if a GSE becomes
unable to meet its obligations.
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae both got into
trouble with accounting irregularities in part
because of the complexities under generally
accepted accounting principles for derivatives
positions and rules determining which assets
should be reported at market value and which
should be reported at amortized historical cost.
Sound risk management practices require that
GSE management base decisions on market values,
or estimates as close to market values as financial
theory and practice permit. The reason is simple:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursue policies
that inherently expose the firms to an extreme
asset/liability duration mismatch. They hold
long-term mortgages and MBS financed by short-
term liabilities. Given this strategy, they must
engage in extensive operations in derivatives
markets to create synthetically a duration match
on the two sides of the balance sheet. These oper-
ations expose the firm to a huge amount of risk
unless the positions are measured at market value.
Almost all the assets and liabilities of the
GSEs are either traded actively in excellent mar-
kets or have values that can be accurately meas-
ured by prices in such markets. For this reason,
the financial condition of the GSEs ought to be
measured through fair-value accounting and such
accounts ought to be the principal yardstick of
condition and performance.
CONCLUSIONS
Since the GSE accounting scandals emerged
in mid-2003, one thing has remained rock-solid:
The GSEs have continued to borrow at yields
5 Most recently, the GAO criticized GSE oversight in Walker (2005).
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6only slightly higher than those of the U.S. govern-
ment and noticeably lower than those available
to any other AAA-rated private company or entity.
In other words, despite the vast recent accumu-
lation of knowledge about the significant risks
run by the GSEs, as well as their inability (or
unwillingness) to manage these risks, investors
in GSE debt securities appear unmoved. Upon
reflection, the lack of market discipline evident
during this crisis period is striking—like a dog
that did not bark. This fact indicates to me that
there still is a significant problem with the GSEs
that needs to be fixed.
The obvious answer to why the dog did not
bark is that the so-called “implicit guarantee”—
that is, the belief by investors that the U.S. govern-
ment would not allow the GSEs to default on
their debt obligations—has not been removed.
Indeed, the talk of increased GSE regulation and
the failure of structural-reform legislation to
become law may actually have reinforced the
belief of many that, overall, the government is
perfectly happy with the situation as it is. The
GSEs remain politically powerful, if less strident
than they were a few years ago.
Three essential reforms are needed to elimi-
nate the GSEs’ threat to financial stability. First
is a limit on their portfolio growth, second is an
increase in their minimal required capital, and
third is satisfactory bankruptcy legislation so that,
should the worst happen, federal authorities can
deal with the problem in an orderly way.
Freddie Mac apparently does not expect any
significant increases in constraints on its opera-
tions. Funds that could have been used to build
capital to better protect taxpayers have instead
been used to increase common stock dividends.
Freddie set a quarterly dividend of $0.22 in the
fourth quarter of 2002 and has increased the div-
idend every year since. As of the fourth quarter
of 2006, the dividend stands at $0.50 per quarter,
more than twice its level four years earlier.
Fannie Mae cut its dividend in half in early 2005
to build capital, but I’ll hazard a guess that once
it starts issuing regular financial statements the
company will increase its dividend rather than
build capital further.
I began this speech noting that the Federal
Reserve has a responsibility to maintain financial
stability. That responsibility includes increasing
awareness of threats to stability and formation of
recommendations for structural reform. I do not
believe that a GSE crisis is imminent. However,
for those who believe that a GSE crisis is unthink-
able in the future, I suggest a course in economic
history.
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Summaries of Recent Studies on GSE Issues
Jaffee (2003) Study of GSE Interest Rate Risk
Dwight Jaffee was one of the first to “peer through” the public disclosures provided by the GSEs
about the interest rate risks they incurred and how they managed them. Jaffee concluded that the
GSEs actually incurred significant interest rate and liquidity risks, despite their own characterization
of such risks as being minimal. Subsequent events and analysis have proven Jaffee correct.
OFHEO (2003) Study of Potential Systemic Risks Posed by GSEs
Even before the GSE accounting scandals broke, the GSEs’ safety-and-soundness supervisor had
prepared a study comprising scenarios in which the GSEs might contribute to systemic risk. Although
OFHEO concluded that the likelihood of one or both GSEs contributing to financial-system instability
was very small, the agency recommended to Congress that its (OFHEO’s) supervisory powers should
be enhanced to further safeguard the GSEs and the financial system.
Public Statements by Chairman Alan Greenspan (2005a,b,c)
Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2005a) rejected the idea of stronger GSE regulation in favor
of portfolio limits, stating that,
World-class regulation, by itself, may not be sufficient and, indeed, might even worsen the potential for
systemic risk if market participants inferred from such regulation that the government would be more
likely to back GSE debt in the event of financial stress…We at the Federal Reserve believe this dilemma
would be resolved by placing limits on the GSEs’ portfolios of assets.
Chairman Greenspan also drew attention to the strains the GSEs could place on the over-the-
counter interest rate derivatives markets due to their portfolio-hedging activities.
Research Papers by Federal Reserve Staff 6
One of these papers estimated the pass-through by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of their funding-
cost advantage into primary mortgage rates, finding a mere 7 basis points of pass-through. Another
paper provided evidence against the GSEs’ claims that their purchasing behavior stabilizes mortgage
rates during periods of market turbulence. Other papers discuss (i) likely competitive interactions
between the GSEs and large banks that will be subject to Basel II capital regulation and (ii) the ill-
structured incentives the GSEs face to increase the size of their portfolios.
Ad Hoc Federal Reserve Study Group Examining GSE Impacts on Interest Rate Derivatives
Markets (Board of Governors, 2005)
The study group identified potential channels through which disruptions at the GSEs could flow
through to other market participants in the over-the-counter markets for interest rate derivatives, like
swaps, interest rate options, and swaptions (options on swaps). The study group reported that market
participants felt current risk-management practices were sufficient to contain risks posed by the
GSEs.
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6 These include Passmore (2005), Sherlund, and Burgess (2005), Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherlund (2006), Hancock et al. (2005), Frame and
White (2005, and Emmons and Sierra (2004).Economic-Capital Analysis of GSEs by Morgan Stanley (Posner, 2005)
Kenneth Posner, an equity analyst at Morgan Stanley, isolated the distinct economic risks faced by
the GSEs and estimated how much capital the firms would need to provide adequate protection to
debtholders to justify an AA senior-unsecured bond rating. This analysis assumed that there would be
no support forthcoming (or expected by financial-market participants) from the federal government.
His estimate of the required equity-to-assets capital ratio was in the range of 4 to 7 percent, about
twice as high as the current GSE ratios of closer to 3 percent. Thus, the GSEs would be significantly
undercapitalized today if there were no expectation of government support of their liabilities.
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